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Toward the end of the last century when the term “economics” came
into use, the government was largely excluded and producers and consumers
came together in the market; the market was the all powerful regulatory force
of society. The science of economics was born in a world where distrust of the
state was based on the assumption that the urgent needs of life (food, clothing
and housing) were all to be satisfied in the private sector. In a modern society,
however, distrust of the state is no longer comprehensible in the view of the
demonstrated failure of the private sector to satisfy fundamental individual and
social needs. (Housing is a clear case of inefficiency and of market response
unrealted to social need.)
Now we know that there is no border between politics and economics
(Galbraith 1967-78, 1973-75, 1983a, Leontief 1982a). The distinction between
economics and politics is now an artificial one. Economic problems are related
to political ones, and in particular to power. Thus Galbraith contrasts the
power of the large, huge corporations —which manifest itself in corporate
planning— with the power of the market. According to him (Galbraith 1973-75)
there are two types of contradictions in all modern industrialized societies:
(i) those between the interest of the “planning system” and society; and
(ii) those between the “planning” and the “market” systems.
The main contradiction in modem societies is not between classes, but
between the two economic systems: the “planning system” related to big
corporations, and the “market system” related to small enterprises. In both
socialist and capitalist countries large-scale enterprises coexist with small-scale
production. Such duality is unavoidable, for while large organizations unde-
niably perform better in some fields (i.e., technologically-advanced, capital-
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intensive industries), small organizations unquestionably perform better in
others (i.e., where individual craftsmanship is required). Thus the socialist
countries “are making somewhat greater use of private initiative for small-scale
activities” (Galbraith and Salinger 1979 p. 29).
The modem economy is a bimodal one in which the members of the
“market system” are price-takers while the members of the “planning system”
are price-setters, and where the latter (being large and powerfully) are conse-
quently able to dictate prices (both for inputs and outputs) for the former
(who are small and weak, and in addition starved of State support). This, at
the world level, is the contradiction between the North (industrially develo-
ped) and the South (underdeveloped) (Galbraith 1983b). The result is clear:
“The will to national independence is the most powerful force in our time”
(Galbraith 1983b p. 36). The new countries, “reject domination by either of
the great powers and ask only for the same right of self-determination desired
by all nations, old and new” (Galbraith 1983b p. 45).
As Galbraith states (1973-75 p. 173), “The planning system [i.e., the
corporation-dominated part of the economy], in the absence of state interven-
tion, is inherently inestable” (1). The old financial oligarchy, blamed by Lenin
and present-day Soviet economists, has given room to the technostructure with
economic and political power over the “market”. As Galbraith suggests (1967-78),
the historical development depends on what role a particular factor of produc-
tion plays in a particular epoch. Initially that factor was land, which predeter-
mined a whole era of agrarian economy; then capital became that factor,
which led to the transition to an era of capital analyzed by Marx; and finally,
the technostructure began to play that part —i.e., the management of large
corporations. According to Galbraith (1967-78, 1973-75), the “technostructure”
is the vehicle of large corporations, which control supply and demand, provi-
sion of capital and minimization of risk in the so-called “planning economy”.
“Power has, in fact, passed to what anyone in search of novelty might be
justified in calling a new factor of production” (Galbraith 1967-78 p. 53): the
technostructure. The technostructure occurs both in the West and in the East.
In fact, large corporations have similar imperatives whether in the West or in
the East: the same organizational structure and communal need for planning
respond to the same technological needs. “The decisive power in modem
industrial societies is exercized not by capital [as stated by Lenin and modern
Soviet economists] but by the industrial bureaucrat. This is true in the Wes-
tern planning systems. It is also true in the socialist countries” (Galbraith and
Salinger 1979 p. XIV). The possession of capital is now no guarantee that the
required technostructure can be organized. Since technology and planning are
what accord power to the technostructure (Galbraith 1967-78), the latter will
have power wherever these are a feature of the productive process within
either the capitalist or the socialist system. (Caveat: “Decentralization in the
Soviet-type economics involves not a return to the market system but a shift
from planning functions from the state to the firm. [...] There is no tendency
(1) The problem of the state is the main difficulty, for the big corporation is closely tied in with
the state. For Galbraith (1973-75 pp. 207-306), today the main stake is on reform. The state
also should be an object of reform.
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for the Soviet and the Western systems to converge by the return of the
former to the market. Both have outgrown that. There is measurable conver-
gence to the same form of planning” (Galbraith 1967-78 p. 100).)
The policy of national economic planning should have the following
goals:
(a) agreement between lines of economic policy from the standpoint of
attainable strategic goals;
(b) reliable economic information of the effects of individual events or
government intervention in the economy as a whole; and
(c) the arrangement of research to bring out the problems that could
arise in the future.
Let us take a look at some different models of economic planning.
2. THE STALINIST ECONOMIC MODEL
The Stalinist model of development includes:
(a) rapid industrialization;
(b) concentration on heavy industry; and
(c) central planning.
The concentration on heavy industry —such as steel and machine tools—,
cutting the resources that might go to agriculture, light industry and the
consumer in order to increase capital investment, leads to accumulate the
necessary resources for the growth in the heavy industry.
The planners found it necessary to set investment mainly from the
agricultural sector. Consequently, consumption and consumer goals were given
a low priority. In Stalin’s primitive accumulation, agriculture and the peasantry
were forced to finance the bulk of accumulation needed for this industrializa-
tion. Likewise, investment for housing and other consumer goods was postpo-
ned in favour of investment for heavy industry. This in itself imposed an
enormous burden on day-to-day life.
The Soviet record was impressive, particularly given the fact that much of
the rest of the world was then suffering from the Great Depression. While
Western Europe and the United States were contending with levels of unem-
ployment of 25 per cent or more and negative economic growth, the Soviet
Union found itself with GNP growth-rates of 4 to 5 per cent and rapidly
disappearing unemployment (Goldman 1983 p. 21).
Led by economist E. G. Liberman some reforms were made in the
1960’s. Factory managers were to continue to operate with the prices establi-
sed by planners, but they were to sell their output and buy their input, rather
than merely deliver or accept them. This meant that each factory was to be
responsive to the particular needs of its customers if it wishes to dispose of its
output. In the same way, its own suppliers would have to be responsive to the
factory’s needs if the suppliers were to get the factory’s business. The profit
would not belong to the factory or its managers, but to the state. A portion of
the profits would indeed be allocated for bonuses and other rewards, so that
there would be a direct incentive to run the plan efficiently.
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In the Soviet Union, however, there exists an enormous private black
market, or “second economy”, that some estimate to amount to as much as
25 per cent of the GNP (Goldman 1983 p. 55).
Even if the Soviet planners do decide to switch resource allocation in
favour of consumer goods [the Eleventh Five-Year Plan specifies that the
output of consumer goods (production of Type B goods) is to increase at a
faster rate than the output of producer goods (Type A goods)] that will not be
enough. It is not only a question of producing more and better food and
manufactured goods for the consumer, but also to ensuring that such goods
are delivered to the consumer in a more efficient and pleasant way [services].
That will requiere both an increase in funds allocated to services and a change
in attitude.
Soviet planners have traditionally held down investment in services (Gold-
man 1983 p. 177). Reflecting Marxist approach, services are generally regarded
as nonproductive. Most services are even omitted from Soviet calculations of
the GNP (Goldman 1983 p. 178). It always has seemed to be ideologically
more satisfying to devote resources to production rather than to fancy ware-
houses, stores, or restaurants.
3. PERESTROIKA
Since 1986, however, a new kind of economic development is taking place
in the Soviet Union.
Perestroika is a program affecting Soviet society at a host of points. It
departs from the recognition of two great deficiencies that have hampered
development of the soviet economy:
First the overcentralization of economic decision-taking. (It is recognized
that the myriad of decisions essential to the smooth working of a great modem
economy cannot all flow from one center, and that a great proportion of them
have to be delegated to people down the line, even if at the cost of a certain
impairment of central governmental control.)
Second, the recognition that Soviet economy cannot be made to function
as it should (and indeed as it must, if it is to compete with the economies of
the great powers) until there can be implanted a greater measure of what
Gorbachev himself (1987) calls “inner stimuli”.
Hence: decentralization of the power of economic and in part political
decision-taking, and the encouragement of what Gorbachev thinks of as demo-
cratization all down the line. This last means a greater measure of consulta-
tion. The form this program takes can be summarized by Gorbachev himself:
“Many things are unusual in our country now: election of managers at
enterprises and offices; multiple candidates for election to Soviets [i.e., local
government-organs] in some districts; joint ventures with foreign firms; self-
financed factories and plants, state and collective farms; the lifting of restric-
tions on farms producing food products for enterprises and run by them;
wider cooperative activities; encouragement of individual enterprise in small
scale production and trade; and closure of non-paying plants and factories
operating at a loss; and of research institutes and higher educational establis-
hements working inefficiently”.
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These reforms will probably be greater in their application to agriculture,
where they envisage measures as drastic as the restoration of the independent
family farm, than in their aplication to industry.
Even more far-reaching are the changes of approach in foreign relations.
They include not only extensive reversals of stablished policy but actual
revisions of basic Marxist orthodox postulates. Admitting that the class-motivated
approach to all phenomena of social life was once the ABC of Marxim,
Gorbachev now asserts that the nuclear weapons has changed all that. Class
confrontation, once the final determinant of all social-political development,
now for the first time finds itself confronted with an objetive limit. Unable to
advance beyond that limit, it is being supplanted by what Gorbachev calls a
real, not speculative and remote, common human interest —the need, that is,
to save all humanity from nuclear disaster. Traditional Marxist logic had it that
imperialism inevitably engendered major arms confrontations, the ultimate
outcome of which would be social upheavals; and these, in turn, would finish
off the capitalist system for good and thus establish global peace. According to
Gorbachev this logic is not valid. The cause and effect relationship between
war and revolution has itself fallen victim to the harsh realities of the nuclear
age. Political and ideological competition between capitalist and socialist coun-
tries will of course continue; but “it can and must be kept within a framework
of peaceful competition which necessarily envisages cooperation”. Hence the
necessity of “a new dialectic of the common human and class interests and
principles in our modem age”. (Something that was advanced some time ago
by Sakharov (1968).)
For the leader of a movement that regards Marx as the creator and
inspirer of a revolution from which it derives its origin these are not only
strong words but words of great theoretical import. And the practical conclu-
sions to which they relate, when it comes to the nuclear arms race and its
implications for policy, are no less far-reaching. The nuclear weapon is recog-
nized as a suicidal nuclear weapon, capable of bringing nothing less than
disaster to whoever might venture to use it. So long as it remains in national
arsenals, and to the extent that it does, it is a menace to all of us. Nor is there
any security to be gained from the effort to diminish the security of anybody
else. The other fellow’s security is in fact one’s own. The striving for military
superiority thus serves no purpose. This is a far cry from the once fashionable
doctrine that a formidable offensive posture was the best deterrence.
4. THE HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCE
Hungary is short of energy —and raw materials which have to be impor-
ted. The internal market is small. The Hungarian economy cannot, therefore,
be closed; it is dependent on the world economy. The economic duties of
Hungary in the eighties (Balassa 1985 p. 48) meant that a modem economic
and planing mechanism had to start which assist better ajustment to world
economic processes and a more efficient economic growth. Hungary has
developed a greater consensus for its political and economic goals than any
other country in Eastern Europe.
248 José Félix Tobar-Arbulu
Balassa has dealt with planning and economic policy in today’s Hungary,
where indicative guidelines, instead of command planning, are used. According
to him (1985 p. 46), “The Hungarian planning system and its methods make
use of the experience of other countries —primarily the socialist countries, but
also of other countries that are engaged in planning. (...) some of the Hunga-
rian economists (...) reached the conclusion that in the circumstances of the
Hungarian economy [the Soviet planning practice] requiered substantial modi-
fications”. (The Soviet plan expressed mandatory instructions to firms, deter-
mining in instructions the distribution of resources, production and sales. This
is called the directive system of planning.)
The Hungarian economic mechanisms organically connects the planned-
control with the market-, commodity- and monetary relations. The autonomy
of the economic units is gradually increasing. Central planning is no longer
effected through instructions [as in the Soviet model] but by economic regula-
tors. The state no longer fixes production and selling duties, it does not
distribute the resources among producers by administrative methods.
Thus, the main characteristics of the Hungarian planning system includes
“planning activities on various levels for the country as a whole, planning by
the economic units, as well as planning by the country and municipal coun-
cils” (Balassa 1985 p. 48).
Planning on the national economic levels means planning by the state. It
includes the formulation of the econmic policy, which provides guidance for
national economic planning, including both economic targets and instruments.
The target system of socioeconomic evolution includes:
(a) the general lines and priorities of economic policy;
(b) the resources, rate and proportions of economic growth;
(c) the directions of fundamental structural changes in production, the
infrastructure and external economic relations;
(d) the main requirements of external and internal equilibrium;
(e) the main principles and proportions of the resources which are
available for domestic utilization in consideration of the former;
(f) the main directions and principles of scientific and technological
progress, as well as of investments;
(g) the objectives of employment and of the improvement in the stan-
dard of living and living conditions; and
(h) the main duties of regional development as well as of environmental
protection.
The methods by which the state controls the economy, paying attention
to the autonomy of firms are:
(i) instruments of indirect economic control, laying down guidelines; and
(ii) direct decisions and interventions.
The first ones include guidelines for:
(a) price policy and price regulation;
(b) financial policy, including the regulation of company income (taxa-
tion and subsides), the finances of the councils, and regulation of the incomes
of the workers;
(c) the monetary and credit policy; and
(d) the regulation of external economic activity.
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The second ones concern:
(a) the central economic development project and the government action
programs;
(b) central state investments; and
(c) the operational principles of state market supervision and the rules of
distribution of certain products.
Planning is a continuos activity, with the study of flexible and alternative
plans, where “Participation by the public is part of the trend of modernization
and democratization” of the country (Balassa 1985 p. 50). Firms, cooperatives
and other economic organs prepare their plans independently, for their own
purposes: they are approved by their own management bodies. The economic
units set out from their own possibilities, the conditions and requirements of
the market. They take into consideration the effect of indirect economic plans,
as well as the direct decisions of the national economic plan.
(See Balassa (1985) for the state economic control organs, the changes in
economic policy to bridge the gap between the developed countries and
Hungary, taking into account the external conditions and the internal equili-
brium in order “to accelerate active adjustment to world economic processes,
technical development, the transformation of the production structure, the
increase in efficiency, and the modernization of production and of the
infrastructure”.)
The changes introduced in 1985 in the system of economic control
improve the autonomy and initiative of producing companies, they stimulate
effective growth, offering incentives as well as applying constraints. “The
promotion of market-oriented management and of competition will in coming
years reduce the extent of the state regulation of prices. The forms of com-
pany income regulation, including the taxation of profits will regroup to the
more efficient and the firms will be able to use a larger share of their
increasing income than before for investments and to increase the personal
income of their staff. The subsidizing of some firms out of the state resources
has been reduced considerably and will be reduced further” (Balassa 1985 p.
56).
5. SELF-MANAGEMENT
The self-management system, which proceeds from the principle that
each development decision ought to be made at that particular management
level at which some given goal can be best and most fully achieved presuposes
multilevel management, i.e., management at more levels that is the case with
centralized systems. A decision is to be referred to a higher level only when it
cannot be fully and correctly comprehended and formulated at a lower level.
Two issues arise when choosing a particular level of management: (i)
what the goals of the higher levels means to the lower levels under the
conditions of self-management; and (ii) what the optimal decisions is, and how
it is reached.
Self-management planning requires a very clear differentiation between
the planning of development policy and the technology of planning. The
technology of planning is a task for expert services.
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The relationship between industrial and territorial planning entails:
(a) planning that runs from the single enterprise to the industry as a
whole, where the industry is often organized in the form of specific integration
of all enterprises in order to divide the production program and coordinate
mutual development; and
(b) planning from the single municipality (commune) as the lowest
territorial organization, to groups of a few nearby municipalities (smaller
regions), up to the republics and provinces, to Yugoslavia as a whole.
(See Stojanovic (1982) for planning procedures from a section in a plant
—the smallest organizational unit— to the enterprises to various forms of
integration of enterprises to municipalities to republics and the whole federa-
tion of republics in the context of Yugoslavia, as well as for the control of plan
implementation and the evaluation of corrective measures.)
Stojanovic (1982 pp. 41 ff) classifies some open problems in the Yugoslav
system of self-management planing into three groups: (i) problems related to
the selection of development priorities (i.e., selection of priorities in the
medium-term development of the country, since Yugoslavia is a multinational
state); (ii) problems which stem from the industry-territory relationship (i.e.,
maximization of gross income per employed person versus maximization of
gross income per citizen; finding the optimal relation between industry and
territory is essential in the process of planning); and (iii) problems from the
domain of planning methodology. (See Ackoff 1974, 1978, 1981, Ackoff et al,
1984 for optimization of means to a given plan.)
The Yugoslavs have never satisfactorily solved their inflation, unemploy-
ment, misallocation of capital, and foreign-trade deficits (Goldman 1983 p. 57).
(As to the success of the Yugoslav system, in 1986 its unemployment was 15 %
and its rate of inflation 80 %. Within the Marxian school, Marcovic and
Petrovic (1979) have dealt with a serious critical elucidation of the concepts of
praxis, alienation (in particular alienated labour), self-management and a criti-
que of the bureaucratic establishment in the context of the  and 
in Yugoslavia.)
6. THE PLANNING OF THE “PLANNING SYSTEM”
Nothing reliably relates growth in one industry to growth in related and
dependent industries. Thus we have fuel crises, energy crises, and others.
These crises have already forced government to reject the mith of the imper-
sonal market and to plunge into the world of democratic planning.
Some economists believe that there cannot be a satisfactory control of
business until the government is freed from the powerful influences of those
who manage the large corporations (Gruchy 1974). Different solutions have
been proposed for this control:
(a) the “domestication” of private business by establishing a national
planning program, or what Clark (1926) described as “social-liberal planning”
(2).
(2) According to this view, large corporations should be placed in an institutional framework in
which all sectorial interests, including private business, would be subordinated to the national
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(b) the planning of the planning system (Galbraith 1973-75) by a plan-
ning authority. Galbraith describes this sort of planning economy of the future
as a “new socialism”, a non-Marxian type of socialism (3). (According to
Heilbroner (1974 pp. 57-58 & 84), if economic development is to be directed
in the interest of society there will have to be a “hull-fleged transformation of
‘private’ capitalism into ‘planned’ state capitalism.”)
There is today a need for both national and international planning, for as
Gruchy (1974 p. 246) puts it, “national planning cannot work well in the long
run without considerable international planning”. The problems of energy
shortages and transnational corporations activities cannot be tackled success-
fully as purely domestic problems. This social control of business is one of the
gravest issues of our times.
The social control over the economy in present-day society needs to set
up and develop a state system of indicative planning (Galbraith 1973-75,
Leontief 1977 Ch. 11). Planning is one of the instruments of state power and
should be used to enhance social justice. State planning implies social com-
promise, social cooperation and consensus (4). This way, planning can avoid
the overexploitation of economic resources and reduce the negative side-
effects in the natural and social environment of private and public enterprises.
Moreover, the economic growth should be assessed on the basis of a broad
complex of criteria reflecting indicators of quality of life instead of the merely
Gross National Product.
7. PLANNING: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
Two main arguments have being advanced in favour of planning by Leon-
tief and Galbraith (Leontief and Stein 1976). The first is the need to coordina-
te the existing forms of government regulations through an independent agency
that will provide “information to legislators and administrators responsible for
national economic policies [...] outlining appropriate methods to carry them
out” (Leontief 1982a p. 33) (5). The second is that the  ushered in a new
interest. “This control could not be effective in an unplanned capitalist system dominated by
private business interests with the power to undermine regulatory agencies and to substitute
private business welfare for national interest” (Gruchy 1974 p. 242).
(3) This kind of socialism searches for the position of weakness in the economy. It is not
ideological but compelled by circumstance. Galbraith associates poverty, unlike Marx, not
with the industrial proletariat as a whole, but with the unskilled and powerless subproletariat
and other people at the bottom of the economic pyramid.
(4) As Myrdal points out (quoted in Gruchy 1974 p. 243), any experiment in the control of
private enterprises with the aid of national planning would call for a public support from a
combination of workers, low-income farmers and beleaguered consumers. “What is needed
is a general agreement between organized labour and organized business that would apply to
major sectors of the economy and would be based on a carefully designed, comprehensive
and voluntary plan” (Leontief 1982a p. 34).
(5) As Leontief suggests (1982a p. 33), this independent agency should provide the “information
needed to work out a systematic, coordinated approach to the main problems of national and
local economic policy. [...] It should be able to anticipate potential trouble spots, the parts of
the economy where, to name only a few examples, energy shortages, technological unem-
ployment, population movements, or sudden needs lor long-term credits may arise. This
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stage in the development of the economy, when government regulation had to
concentrate its efforts not so much in managing demand as on solving the
problem of supply over the long term. Indeed, the 1970's showed that, in
contrast to the preceding period, the problem of increasing scarcity of resour-
ces was coming to the fore: I.e., the supply of resources which could not be
increased on the basis of purely market incentives or through stimulation of
aggregate demand by the government —meaning the industries turning out
basis resources (like energy, raw materials, and foodstuff), sections of the
infrastructure (like transportation and communications), and finally the rehabi-
litation, and protection of the environment (6). The need to solve such
problems connected with production and supply calls for long-term program-
ming of the national economy even for international programming, for, the
interdependence of the different sectors of a national economy needs their
coordination (7) not only at the national level but also internationally. (See
Leontief 1966 Ch. 7 & 11, 1977 Ch. 11 for a general approach to national
economic planning, its methods and problems.) Many projects started today,
the so-called industrial reconversion among others, will depend, for their
ultimate success, on whether they are coordinated with other projects of
development taking place not only in a given national economy but in other
parts of the world (8).
Planning authorities are assigned two distinct functions to perform. First,
they are to make independent forecast, isolate probable future bottlenecks,
and co-ordinate plans throughout the economy. They are also to work in
collaboration with similar authorities in other countries so as to ensure that
agency should not make grand predictions but should elaborate different scenarios, each
describing likely effects to any particular combination of national, regional, and local econo-
mic policies. This would, in fact, be the only means by which the government and the
electorate would be enable to make informed choices among different policies”. For Gal-
braith (1973-75 p. 307) “The state, in short, will take to effects the coordination of which the
planning system [the part of the economy dominated by big corporations] is incapable. There
will have to be a public planning authority. This, in turn, will have to be under the closest
legislative supervision”. This planning of the planning system should reflect not the corpora-
tion’s goals but the public purpose (Galbraith 1973-75 p. 307). A second major problem is the
coordination of planning policies as between the national planning systems, for “National
planning systems, operating internationally, also require a measure of international planning”
(Galbraith 1973-75 p. 311).
(6) See Leontief (1977 Ch. 6 & 7) for the study of the environmentalrepercussions of pollution
on the economic structure within an input-output approach. (For input-output analysis see
Bulmer-Thomas (1982) and Miller and Blair (1985).)
(7) “Under a planning approach national economic policies are not formulated as independent
measures designed to solve particular problems, whether it concerns environmental degrada-
tion, energy shortage, inflation, unemployment, or urban blight. They are coordinated actions
intended to make the entire economy function more effectively and grow along a carefully
projected plan” (Leontief 1982a p. 31).
(8) The interdependence of the different parts of the economy and alternative paths along which
they might advance in the coming years must be systematically explored. “Whether one path
or another is followed is not a professional question but a political decision that must be
reached by democratic processes” (Leontief 1982a p. 31). Further, “it is not surprising that
actions to solve a particular problem create new problems elsewhere. If policy makers act in
ignorance of such indirect interrelationships, measures taken by one government or corpora
te office will tend to cancel out the effects of actions taken by another” (Leontief 1982a
p. 32). Therefore, the need of planning at different levels.
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the smooth adjustment of production and consumption operates on a global
scale: the private planning system, after all, already plans via the multinational
corporation for the world as a whole (9).
The kind of planning espoused in this work emphasizes, above all, the
information importance of the plan. According to Leontief (1977 Ch. 11), the
plan should describe the development of the economy as a whole, including
its key sectors (industry, agriculture and transport), and also the federal and
local budgets for 4-5 years ahead. Leontief asks for several alternative scena-
rios to allow a choice of possible ways to attain a given set of goals. This
analysis of the economic structure can, indeed, “provide a suitable framework
for a concrete [...] description of alternative methods of production and the
realistic realization of alternative paths of technological change” (Leontief 1977
p. 152), for it is essential to analyze the potential effects on the economy and
society of new technologies. (See Leontief and Duchin (1985) for the effects of
the implementation of microelectronics on the economy and society; Leontief
(1966 Ch. 9 & 10) for the economic effects of disarmament; Leontief and
Duchin (1983) for the effects of military spending on civilian technology; and
Leontief (1985) for the choice of technology.) This way, different scenarios can
be worked out for different economic and social policies that could permit the
country to reap the benefits of the new technologies while mitigating their
disruptive effects.
The choice between alternative scenarios is the key to rational planning.
Such scenarios should be worked out not only on the national but also on the
regional and local levels and should be duly dovetailed with each other.
(According to Leontief (1977 Ch. 11 £ 1982a) an autonomous government
agency should be set up to work out these scenarios (5).)
The problem of participation, which we understand as the free participa-
tion in determining public policy and the control of public affairs, is related to
the problem of power and bureaucracy. Participation should involve:
(i) the choice of long-term goals;
(ii) the choice of the optimal means to achieve these goals; and
(iii) the justification of both means and goals.
Instead of dealing with endless ideological debates, participation, in any
political regime whatsoever, should be measured, for, as Alexander et al. (1975
p. 38) observe, “only the people can guide the process of organic growth in a
community. They know the most about their own needs”.
8. AGAINST UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION
Inflation is the product of a plurality of causes. If we recognize a diversity
of causes, we will take an ecclectic view of remedies. This means that will not
allow dogma to govern prescription. We are Keynesian with a difference: we
(9) Here it is necessary the use of complex input-output tables and precisely specified micro-
targets. Planning authorities ought not simply to coordinate the plans of others; they ought
also to impose targets of their own (concerning, say, the optimal rate of growth or the
maximum tolerable level of unemployment) and to have a clear order of priorities.
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are convinced that policies intended to combat recession and inflation via the
manipulation of total demand will only succeed in the small firm sector, in the
“market system”, and that the general market regulation favoured by Keynes
will fail to stabilize the world of large corporations, the “planning system”,
which must for that reason become subject to specific and direct controls on
wages and prices instead.
Here we envisage the formation of an eficient “mixed economy”: a
combination of public and private sectors, development of legislative controls
over the activity of big corporations and market regulation methods (10), and
the formation of mechanisms for public control over the economy, which
would make it possible to exert a purposeful influence on the course of
development. Legislative control over the formation of prices (primarily on the
products of big corporations) and incomes (wage rates, established through the
mechanism of collective bargaining and profits), the need for an egalitarian
legislative policy of redistribution of incomes. A system of national and regio-
nal democratic planning for using guidelines for the development of the
corresponding industries and legislative influence on the formation of the
volume and structure of the final consumer demand for services in the given
sphere. This includes socializing big companies through legislative supervision
over their activity and to promote the development of what Galbriath calls
“market system” through small and medium-scale enterprises, increasing inco-
mes within this system and make these incomes more reliable, and strengthe-
ning its positions vis-a-vis the “planning-system” (i.e., the part of the economy
under the big corporations). The reforms suggested below —Section 9— is what
Galbraith (1973-75 Chapter 27) has called “The Socialist Imperatives”, objecti-
vely conditioned (3).
The remedy against unemployment and inflation is to keep the total
demand in the economy in close relationship to the supply of goods and
services that can be made available when people are fully employed. This
rough equivalence between total demand and total supply is the framework.
As the economy spands, so will public and private spending from borrowed
funds. This must be controlled so that total spending does not increase more
rapidly that the readily available supply of goods. The increase in public
spending from borrowed funds can be controlled by fiscal policy, the increase
in private spending by monetary policy (Galbraith & Salinger 1979).
Remarks
1. Public expenditure should be governed by public needs.
2 . The public and the corporate purposes diverge. It is only on the state
(i.e., through the legislature) that the public must rely for the assertion of the
public interest.
3 . Keynesian militarism is a world threat, aside from a waste of human
and social resources.
(10) Big is beautiful because large tasks require large organizations. And Small is also beautiful,
since small organizations remain responsible for a large number of new products, processes
and services.
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4. Nationalization of enterprises must be tested by results (11).
5. The test of economic achievement is not how much we produce but
what we do to make life more pleasant and tolerable.
6. The introduction of guidelines should be preceded by a six months
freeze on all pay and prices to break the structure of inflationary expectations.
7. The policy should be worked out by a tripartite commission represen-
ting all sides of industry (labour, management and the public). (The recommen-
dations of this commission should be legally enforceable.)
8. The policy should not be temporary but permanent.
9 . Controls must be both comprehensive and integrated into the whole
complex of government policy measures.
10. Incomes should be planned in such a way as to narrow the gap
between the rich and the poor.
11. Controls should apply only to the planning system, not to the
market system.
9. WHAT IS TO BE DONE
The economic measures we propose are necessary if we want the eco-
nomy to work without high unemployment, inflation, restraining effect of low
demand and idle capacity. These actions extend to all who have achieved a
measure of control over their incomes.
Public ownership is indispensable in such fields as railways, highways,
electricity- and gas-supply industries and energy industries in general, teleco-
munications, social services, defense-related industries, big corporations in
general and financial and merchandizing corporations as well as housing
industries and scientific and technological research organizations. Nationaliza-
tion is a practical matter to be tested by results. As Galbraith asserts (Gal-
braith and Salinger 1979 p. 65), “The problem of modern socialism is not a
shortage of faith but a shortage of performance”. Extension of the area of
public ownership is only possible politically and economically as the reputa-
tion for efficient public management is affirmed.
(a) Large business corporation should respect their wage restraint and
not increase their prices. (Public price restraints replace the private price-fixing
of the large corporations.)
(11) The public managers are to be given general targets to reach, but they are also to be given
relative autonomy in the techniques they employ to attain those ends: “Autonomy does not
mean less public-accountability. On the contrary, it means more. But it is accountability not
for method, procedure, or individual action, but for result” (Galbraith 1965 p. 98). The
nature of these results, moreover, is clearly economic, the public corporation being assigned
the duty to finance expansion out of its own earnings and the obligation to apply orthodox
standards of cost and return: “This is not a capitalist test of efficiency, it is the universal and
only test” (Galbraith 1975 p. 20). Socialization means a new source of public finance
(corporate profits flowing into public coffers) and the end of an old abuse (corporate profits
flowing into private pockets). The public enterprise in the parliamentary democracy is
publicly owned for a purpose. The most obvious purpose is to exercise a measure of
democratic control over the enterprise. This control ensures that the firm procedures and
decisions will be in the public interest, that its decisions are sound and sensible and serve
the general good (Galbraith 1965 p. 93).
256 José Félix Tobar-Arbulu
(b) Profits in big corporations should be in line with past experience.
(c) Big trade unions claims should be limited to what can be afforded,
on the average, from increased productivity.
(d) The pay of civil servants should be consistent with the general
restraint.
(e) Minimum farm prices, minimum wages and transportations cost
should be set by public action.
(f) Some price fluctuation for farm products is inevitable.
(g) Small industries, service enterprises and the self-employed should
not be controlled. (Here the market, even though imperfect, still works.)
(h) There should be a specific differential between the lowest-paid wor-
ker and the highest-paid executive.
(i) Taxation must be an integral part of this policy, a progressive policy
of taxation, with more taxes on the affluent. (It reaches the incomes that are
untouched by wage, salary and price restraint.)
(j) Equity should also be served by relatively stiff inheritance taxes.
(k) Social insurance and pension funds should be unaffected.
Union support is vital to the success of this policy. The negotiation and
administration of such a policy is possible because big corporations, unions,
farm federations and white-collar groups are in workable numbers. Where the
market works, though imperfectly, one keeps hand off. Prices of the small
firms, farmers and self-employed are not touched, except as minimums are set
by government.
The efforts needed to remedy the weakness of the market system include.
(1) General exemption for small businessmen from all prohibitions in
the antitrust laws against combination to stabilize prices and output.
(2) Direct government regulation of prices and production in the “mar-
ket system”.
(3) Strong and effective encouragement to trade union organization in
the market system.
(4) An extension and major increase in the minimum wages.
(5) A cautiously revised view of tariff protection in the “market system”.
An international agreement stabilizing prices and production by official action
or a tariff.
(6) A strong presumption in favour of government support to the educa-
tional, capital and technological needs of the market system.
The solution is to bring return in the “market system” more or less into
line with that in the “planning system” and to provide an alternative income
to those who are not employed or cannot be employed.
The legislative must acknowledge the existence of domestic imperialism
in a wide range of markets; comprehend that there is no automatic tendency
towards equalization of factor-rewards as between the two subsystems of
modern economy; and intervene in the cause of social justice by assisting the
disadvantaged to acquire power of their own.
Thus the government should itself either perform or finance research and
development on behalf of small business. This represents a valuable external
economy (particularly since each small farmer or entrepreneur cannot effort
his own laboratory, or even to make a modest contribution toward co-operative
effort), and may also lead to the improvement of many vital products (such as
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low-cost housing, a field in which technological advance is neglected by the
technostructure. The results of government-sponsored research and develop-
ment projects should, of course, be made generally available (should not, in
other words, be protected by secrecy or patents); and their implementation
should be facilitated, in case of need, by government provision of capital and
even by government advertising campaigns.
The government should lend its support to schemes which seek to
improve the bargaining power of the small and the weak (say, by aiding them
to form coalitions and cartels, to consolidate and merge, to limit new entry
into a trade). Further measures along these lines are clearly in the national
interest since they help to strengthen the position of the “market system” as a
whole (and of each individual beneficiary within it) and since they thus help
to improve the domestic (inter-systemic) terms of trade (by raising the prices
charged by small firms relative to those charged by large corporations with
pre-existent original power).
The concentration of power that destroyed the market and made such a
policy necessary has also reduced the number of organizations with which the
government must deal. That means regulating incomes that are already regula-
ted by a few unions and prices that are already regulated by few big corpora-
tions. The additional bureaucracy need not be large.
These reforms bring with them the need of national indicative planning
and a sense of common national interests between the different economic
agents through social consensus and cooperation. Power equalization is not
simply a domestic problem; and in an open economy it is therefore incum-
bent on the government to ensure that adequate countervailing power opera-
tes internationally as well as at home. On the international scene, the large
firm can protect itself through its sheer size and through the possibility of
becoming multinational; while the small firm, by contrast, may need govern-
ment support to its power, in the form of quotas, tariffs and internationally
commodity agreements. (These measures are, admitedly, interferences with
“free trade”; but it must be recognized that the so-called “free trade” has
unwelcomed redistributive consequences insofar as the weak tend to suffer
more than the strong from the bracing cold shower of international competi-
tion. The strong have already scaped from the shackles of the market; it is
only just that the weak should now be assisted to do so as well.)
The government should help to redress the inter-systemic imbalance of
power, but it should not forget to correct the intra-systemic imbalance as well;
and should in particular help to buttres positions of weakness within the
“market system”, where many of the greatest abuses of power are today to be
found.
10. UPSHOT
The free market, so praised by neoclassicists, is gone as Galbraith has
repeatedly showed. (See also Leontief (1982b, 1983) for the state of economics
and more criticisms to present day research in economics.) Modem economy
is a mixture of two systems: the planning one with big corporations, large
farmhouses, big labour unions and the government; and the market one with
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small enterprises, farmers, and consumers. It is the large corporations that set
the price. Governmental regulations are the only protection for small business
and the public. Planning is used not only by big corporations but also to
regulate socialist economies and should also be used to guide the economic
growth of Third World countries. (In the later case, the government must play
the leading economic role, for it is the only social institution with the financial
resources and the political power needed to do so.)
Today the dilemma is not freedom versus planning, but that between
democratic and authoritarian planning: between participative and decentralized
planning on the one hand, and bureaucratic and rigid planning on the other.
The choice between an alienating planing and a genuine one is not a technical
choice to be made by experts but a political and social choice to be made by
the public (Leontief 1977).
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